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not impute a certain normative content to the principles of argumentation, then such a content was smuggled into the theory at a later stage via the strictly universalist interpretation of the conditions of reciprocity and symmetry. Since I have struggled to meet these objections and still hold on to the core ideas behind the program of a discourse ethic, in jettisoning 'U', I chose to admit the material normative content of the rules governing practical discourses. I wrote:
'D' [the central premise of discourse ethics], together with those rules of argument governing discourses, the normative content of which I summarized as the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, are in my view quite adequate to serve as the only universalizability test. (37) The gist of my reformulation of discourse ethics is, then, the admission that the two principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity are always already implied by any formulation of practical discourses and hence cannot be said to be established only as their result.
This strategy leads to a certain circularity, but following some insights of hermeneutic philosophy, I suggest that this circularity is not vicious, but unavoidable. Within the hermeneutic horizon of the political and ethical legacy of modernity and as a result of endless political and ethical struggles, the norms of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, in however contested a fashion, become part of our moral-political universe. We contest them even when we take them for granted in some form or other, according to some interpretation or other. Although any specific interpretation of these norms is open to dispute in a discourse situation, the very step leading to a discursive moral argumentation presupposes some prior understanding [Vorverstdndnis] of these norms.
At first sight this statement may seem not only naive, but simply false in the face of the many racisms, xenophobisms, and nationalisms produced by modernity since the seventeenth century. Moral optimism of progress is not part of my agenda. Rather, what I am suggesting here, and what needs further historical and cultural analysis in order to be substantiated, is a dialectic of universalism and discrimination, the simultaneous spread of the ideals of equality and the formation of prejudice towards "others."6 Intergroup prejudice has always existed in human history. What needs to be investigated is how, after the spread of the universalist ideals of the Enlightenment, social and political prejudice is caught up in a dialectic of justification which is wholly different than the systems of prejudice which dominated premodernity. In the latter, such difference among peoples, classes, genders, and races is thought to have a basis in nature, ontology, or theology. Modernity destroys these sources of justification -more or less; in doing so, it almost creates a heightened need for repression in order to reestablish difference and discrimination.7
This "hermeneutic universalism of modernity" may be what is most disturbing to Peter Dews, for it does mean a certain contextualism, but not of the sort which he imputes to me. I would never deny, as he seems to imply that I do, that the steps leading individuals from the moral struggles of everyday life to the "epoche" of practical discourses require strenuous levels of cognitive and psychological abstraction. Neither the motivational willingness nor the cognitive capacity to engage in discourses and to argue for the validity of controversial norms from the standpoint of all concerned falls from heaven. Such abilities and capacities are indeed contingent upon the cultural, institutional, and political resources and histories of collectivities; they also presuppose a certain level of cognitive and psychological development among individuals. In this sense, I am a "pragmatist," as Dews observes, but one who believes not in "naturalizing reason," but in discovering the historicity of its becoming.
Dews asks whether in my view "it is the acquiring of reason which is contingent, or whether reason, as something acquired, is contingent."8 My position is that genesis and validity -the claim that certain theses are rationally justifiable, in whatever way they may be acquired -are distinct, and that validity cannot be reduced to genesis. Like Hegel, I
6. For example, as historians of anti-Semitism like Hannah Arendt, Jacob Katz, and George Mosse have investigated, modem anti-Semitism, which developed after the French Revolution, could no longer appeal to the theological tradition of Christian prejudice against the Jews as "killers of God's son," etc. Modem anti-Semitism had to ground itself differently: by appealing to cultural and racial theories of difference, for example. We may say that the Nazi theories of race and Jewish racial difference often exhibited the insane and extravagant characteristic that they did, precisely because they were so counterfactual to the moral everyday experience of so many Germans and Jews.
7. I am grateful to Paul Gilroy for his exploration and implementation of some of these ideas concerning my narrative of modernity in The Black Atlantic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993).
8. Dews 107.
believe that the self-reflection of reason upon the conditions of its own becoming is an aspect of any defensible concept of theoretical and practical rationality, but that such self-reflection, although necessary, is not sufficient by itself for the articulation of such a concept of rationality. In fact, I do accept the "'context-bursting force' of validity claims," which Dews seems to suggest I do not. At several points in Situating the Self I make this clear: in discussing conceptions of the good life entertained by some religious communities, the content of which may clash with basic human, civil, and political rights, as anchored in various Bills of Rights and constitutions, I maintain that such rights "trump" over these conceptions of the good life in the event of a clash (44ff). I take up the problem of cultural relativism, very briefly and programmatically, in a lengthy footnote and suggest that both philosophical arguments about the unviability of radical views of incommensurability, and sociological facts about the development of modernity on a world scale since the sixteenth century would be part I certainly completely subscribe to this principle of political, legal, and civic equality and justice. Only, I think that it is inappropriate to think of the standpoint of the "concrete other" in terms of criteria of anti-discrimination alone. It is only in the course of the moral conversation that we can learn those aspects of the otherness of the other which the other wants us to respect and/or to take into account in our deliberations. The concreteness of the concrete other is established through first person self-descriptions. It is in this sense epistemologically indeterminate. Sterba therefore is too quick to assume that we can set aside all knowledge of general and concrete others, "except that knowledge which would lead to biased choices or stand in the way of an unanimous agreement." What knowledge is this, and how does the theorist know which knowledge would stand in the way of unanimous agreement? No one knows; it is only in the course of the moral conversation that we can discover those points of contention about our identities, interests, conceptions of the good and the like which may not lead to agreement. Does this admission not make my interpretation of the dialogic situation vulnerable to total perspectivism? How can any norms on which we can all agree result from such a dialogue if the standpoint of the concrete other is so situationally contingent and interpretively indeterminate?
In retrospect, and as a result of further reflection on these matters, it would have been desirable for me to have distinguished more clearly between the moral standpoint and the standpoint of justice. The perspective of institutional justice, as embodied in the macro institutions of our societies, as John Rawls rightly points out, articulates rules of collective coexistence in the face of continuing and permanent disagreement about our conceptions of the good and different ways of life which we choose to pursue and cherish. Rules of justice articulate principles upon which we can agree when we know we cannot agree about our ethical conceptions concerning, for example, identity or the good life. Unfortunately, the program of discourse ethics has always been ambiguously situated between articulating a position of justice on the one hand and a moral standpoint on the other. This conflation was repeated in Situating the Self; in an attempt to distinguish between a universalist moral standpoint and the narrow standpoint of institutional justice, I did not articulate clearly enough the distinction between the standpoint of justice and that of ethical-moral dialogue. Sterba is wrong in insisting that the "original position" can accommodate the standpoint of the concrete other; but, following Rawls, he is right to insist that some distinction between the standpoint of institutional justice, which is always articulated from the standpoint of the generalized other, and the perspective of morality, which must also take the standpoint of the concrete other into account, is crucial. James Sterba's second objection pertains to "object domain" issues in ethical theory. It goes as follows: why is it relevant to take the stand- may be more relevant at the level of application of moral principles. Thus, a possible and plausible Rawlsian response to the Canadian example discussed above may be that forms of group-differentiated citizenship and other aspects of constitutional design emerge at second and third stages of the theory, when we are concerned with applying principles of justice to design institutional frameworks compatible with them. I would agree with this distinction between contexts of justification and contexts of application. In fact, without some such distinction, one could not defend coherently the rights of minorities who live in ethnically, linguistically mixed communities. Whence then the continuing disagreement with the Rawlsian, hypothetical contractualist?
Let me put the point paradoxically: the Rawlsian construction of an "original position" behind a "veil of ignorance" cannot serve as an adequate articulation of a dialogical moral point of view, precisely because it interprets the generalized other too much along the model of a specific concrete other. It has now been established in the literature that those choosing behind a veil of ignorance are sociologically envisioned as male heads of household. As Susan Okin has pointed out, the basic structure of the family is not subject to the norms of justice.13 Furthermore, assumptions about limited altruism, "not to take an interest in each others' interests, etc.," or the imputation of narrow models of economic rationality as motivational forces driving agents, suggest that the philosophical anthropology behind the "original position" does privilege a subject of rights who is a professional or upwardly mobile, male head of household. Now, I think that this anthropological model of the agents behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance does not discredit the contents at least of the first principle of justice.14 What this means is that one has to distinguish even more carefully between a concept of the moral person on the one hand, and a certain anthropological, psychological, sociological model presupposed by such a concept on the other.
Precisely because I do not define the standpoint of the "concrete 13. Susan Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989) ch. 5. 14. I add the qualification of "at least the first principle of justice," for I think that the second principle of distributive justice is dependent both in content and in terms of the logic of justification upon a set of psychological and cultural, and perhaps biased, assumptions about the desirability of certain ways of life. Is it the case that no matter what else we want, we always want more of those primary goods like money, wealth, power, influence, and the basis of self-respect? See my discussion of this issue and of how we can identify the "least advantaged individual" in Situating the Self 168ff.
other" theoretically and leave this open to situational specification, my model can accomodate more psychological and sociological diversity than can Rawls's construction. The paradox here is that the more abstract the "generalized other" is, the more concrete the concrete other can get. The less we as theorists smuggle certain identity definitions into the construction of the moral point of view, the more open and diversified will this construction be and the more capable of accommodating difference.
A related point, also raised by Sterba, concerns the possibility of "hypothetical moral reasoning"; Sterba seeks to defend such reasoning against charges of what I would call "substitutionalism," i.e., putting one's own point of view in the place of the moral needs and perspective of the other. Whereas Iris Young thinks that all moral reasoning can be suspected of "substitutionalism," I actually agree with Sterba that hypothetical reasoning is both inevitable and necessary. Here my language of "reversibility of perspectives" and "taking the standpoint of all involved into account" comes in. I think the political concerns voiced by Allison Jaggar and Iris Young about the dangers of "substitutionalism" inherent in this procedure are real enough, but so are the concerns raised by Sterba that a lot of the time we face situations of moral conflict or choice in which we cannot resort to a real dialogue, but must act, take a stance here and now. We must engage then in a hypothetical moral conversation with others whom our actions and positions will affect. Dialogical ethics urges us, whenever and however possible, to seek the dialogue with the other who will be affected by my actions and choices, but there are circumstances when I must be able to choose and to act even without such dialogue. I would say that this is more frequently the case in situations of personal and informal contexts of interpersonal morality -in family life, in friendships, in love relations. Norms of justice for the collectivity can only be established through the widest possible participation of all involved and concerned. Here dialogic participation is a precondition of legitimacy; in personal and interpersonal contexts, hypothetical moral reasoning from the standpoint of all involved is a precondition of the moral value of our principles and actions.
The final objection raised by James Sterba concerns the neglect of issues of animal rights and environmental justice in both Rawlsian and in discourse ethics. I think it would be important here to distinguish between two sets of concerns: it is true that these issues have not been at the center of neo-Kantian theories of justice or of ethics. Does this neglect imply, however, a need for an ontological overhaul of universalistic theories? In order to accommodate concerns with animal rights and environmental justice, must we abandon the philosophical premise that all valid and just norms have to be open to validation through processes of collective choice or dialogue, variously defined? Because neither animals nor trees can participate in such collective choices or conversation, does this mean that we must develop an ethic that is "in tune with nature," or grounded upon nature? I do not think so, and although I cannot argue for this point here, I would say that an ethic founded upon nature would be most inappropriate to preserve justice, autonomy, and inequality in complex modem societies. Sterba himself does not go this route. Instead, he would like to have some mechanisms in discourses and other hypothetical choice situations through which the interests of all should be represented, "and so nonhumans will require human advocates acting reasonably on their behalf." Since the entitlement of these nonhumans to act in this way as well as the content of their recommendations as "representing" the interests of non-human nature can themselves be subject to discursive or contractual validation, it follows that discourse and contract models can accommodate concern with such issues without having to alter the basic philosophical and meta-ethical premises on which they rest. Trees do not speak to us: it is always some of us who try to sensitize others to notice certain things about non-human nature and to convince them that we must coexist within nature with other non-human beings in a certain way for the sake of our own future collective well-being. Young's 'logical' objections to the idea of reversibility of perspectives partially derive from my use of the term "symmetry". This is interpreted by Iris Young to mean "images of mirror sameness." But this is not a fair extrapolation. I distinguish explicitly among "formal" and "complementary" norms of reciprocity and equality (158ff). Symmetry, understood as formal equality, is restricted to the standpoint of the generalized other, and does not imply "images of mirror sameness" of concrete individuals -obviously an absurd proposition, since what is concrete is concrete because it can be differentiated from its other. Symmetry refers to the equality of subject positions. Following Hegel in particular, I have used the term "symmetry" somewhat broadly to designate the symmetry of subject positions.
As will be recalled, in Hegel's construction, the struggle for recognition begins with a radical denial of symmetry, i.e., with the denial of recognition on the part of each self vis a vis the other that the other is also a self, i.e., that although it is an other to me, this being, like me, is aware of its own selfhood.16 Each not only knows itself to be an other in the eyes of the other, but also knows that the other is aware of this its otherness in my own eyes. This is why the process is "doubled." For Hegel, to become a self means learning to reconcile the perspectives I have of myself with the perspective that the other has of me; it means negotiating a viable self-conception between the perspective I have of myself and that you have of me. Self consciousness is always ex-centric; it is always for another.
Thinkers like George Herbert Mead have articulated this thesis in terms of social role theory: to become a person in the social world, let us say, to become a teacher, means to learn to reverse perspectives and consider the standpoint of the "student." A teacher, to be able to teach, this particular subject-matter as a problem and as a puzzle. Furthermore, a good teacher would have some sense of her authority and image in the eyes of the students and how this requires or does not require a certain class-room behavior, mode of self-presentation, pedagogical style. And certainly we have all had teachers and professors who, fully aware of all perspectives involved, would also create situations of cognitive dissonance by surprising expectations, tearing down prejudices, rattling our images of ourselves, and the like. Social roles imply symmetry in the sense that they imply an ability to see and to interpret the world from the standpoint of others to whom I stand in certain relations.
If "symmetry" is understood as the formal equality of subject positions, which precisely as concrete subjects are not at all "mirror images of sameness," and if "reversibility of perspectives" is understood to entail not symmetry of concrete selves but the capacity to look at the world from others' points of view, then both symmetry and reversibil- If the other is already within me, why should it be so difficult for me to recognize the other outside me? Intersubjectivity implies the complex coexistence of self and other in intrapsychic as well as in interpsychic space. Precisely because the individual comes to be a self by learning to reverse perspectives in moral and social space, it can also always more or less take the standpoint of the other into account and consider the world as it appears from that perspective.
Iris Young is concerned with this point because she thinks that too hasty an admission of the symmetry of subject positions would not allow us to deal with and to reflect upon those political differences which really divide us. She believes that it is problematic to enjoin social agents to adopt the standpoint of others across relations of privilege and oppression. I agree with Young that "substitutionalist universalism" in moral and political theory has served to occlude the standpoint of others by not allowing for the theoretical space within which such others can articulate their own self-understandings. The whole point of discourse ethics is, in fact, to promote participatory political structures, which would eliminate substitutionalism and augment public chances for articulating one's standpoint as one sees it and in one's own language.
Whence the disagreement? Iris Young thinks that it is ontologically and fundamentally impossible for social groups to think, to see, to understand the standpoint of other social groups. Her example of the Hill-Thomas debates suggests this. I think this is wrong. She falls again into the danger of essentializing group identities and not taking into account the contested and fragile construction of "group standpoints". Groups, no less than individuals, in fact more so, are composed of different, competing, clashing voices, perspectives, and narratives. Since there is no unitary group perspective, but always a more or less coherent construction of group identity, the perspectives of those outside a group may very well be part of the narrative of that group about its own identity. Intergroup dialogue very often takes the form of each group articulating the perspective it has of the other for itself, and groups contest these perspectives of each other, which very often harbor prejudice, denigrations and/or phantasmagoric idealizations of each other. If anything, the Thomas-Hill debates revealed the fragile, multiple, and essentially contestable aspects of group identity.1 Who, for example, was supposed to define what it was to be an "African-American woman"? African-American males, whose own perspectives ranged all over the spectrum; African-American females, who were equally divided, or white feminists, who were themselves at loggerheads over their support for Anita Hill?18 The conclusion I draw from this event is quite the opposite of Iris Young's: it seems to me that the Hill-Thomas struggle proved for the first time that a significant coalition around the language of feminism, which would cut across racial divides had become possible.
The political and ethical project, which Young and I share, is to increase everyone's capacity to articulate in public their standpoint as they see fit; yet such articulation prompts learning and transformation in others. Precisely because reversibility of perspectives is possible, social learning around issues like sexism, racism, and ethnic discrimination is possible. Moral change and political transformation can only take place through learning to take the standpoint of the other into account. This, like psychoanalysis, is an interminable process; for social life generates conflicts and distortions of perspectives, idealizations and mythologizations as well as demonizations of others. Social reconciliation is a utopian wish. All we can hope for is a society in which all groups and individuals can live in dignity and justice without having to suffer mythologization or demonization in the eyes of others. And all we can expect of a universalist ethical theory is to articulate the minimum principles of moral and political life such as to guide our intuitions as we navigate the waters of moral choice, conflict, and indeterminacy.
Iris Young suggests that communicative ethics needs to distinguish between "taking the standpoint of the other person, reversing perspectives with others, and taking the perspective of others into account in making moral and political judgments." This is a plausible request, and as long as it does not commit us to an individualistic nominalism or group essentalism, I am willing to heed it. 
